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CASE NOTES
CIVIL PROCEDURE-FEDERAL JURISDICTION-FEDERAL TEST OF
"DOING BUSINESS" DETERMINES CORPORATE AMENABILITY
TO SERVICE OF PROCESS IN FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION.
Goldberg v. Mutual Readers League, Inc. (E.D. Pa. 1961).
Defendants, Mutual Readers League, Incorporated and Saul Schenker,
were charged with violating certain provisions of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act.' Jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action is conferred
upon the United States District Courts by Section 17 of the Act.2 Con-
tending that as a foreign corporation it was not subject to the jurisdiction
of the district court, defendant corporation moved to dismiss the govern-
ment's complaint. Defendant corporation, although operating principally in
Des Moines, Iowa, was incorporated in the state of Delaware. It was
engaged in the business of selling subscriptions to various magazines
through "contract-dealers" in numerous states. Defendant Schenker
represented the corporation as contract-dealer in Pennsylvania under an
agreement designating him as "independent contractor." In spite of this
description, the court found that the defendant corporation exercised a
high degree of control over Schenker and his employees. 3 The government
contended that defendant Schenker was defendant corporation's agent,
that the former activities constituted "doing business" in Pennsylvania,
and that therefore defendant corporation was subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the federal district court. The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in denying defendant corpora-
tion's motion to dismiss, held that defendant corporation's contacts in that
district were sufficient to subject it to the jurisdiction of the court.
Goldberg v. Mutual Readers League, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa.
1961).
There are neither rules nor statutes to which the federal district courts
may resort to determine when foreign corporations are amenable to service
of process so that in personam jurisdiction may be had over them in
either diversity or non-diversity suits. 4 In the instant case, violation
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 219 (1958).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1958).
3. The court found that Schenker could deal only in those magazines represented
by the defendant corporation. The corporation, moreover, had the right to set
terms and conditions of sale and to inspect Schenker's books at any time. Schneker
also had to meet -certain sales quotas and to remit forty per cent of his proceeds
to the corporation three times weekly. Goldberg v. Mutual Readers League, Inc.,
195 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
4. Individuals and corporations within the geographic boundaries of the state
in which the district court sits are amenable to service of process. FPD. R. Crv.
(117)
1
Coyle: Civil Procedure - Federal Jurisidiction - Federal Test of Doing B
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1961
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
of a federal statute was the basis of the litigation, and the Fair Labor
Standards Act granted the federal district court jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. 5 This was not a diversity situation. In those
cases which arise in the federal courts solely on the basis of diversity of
citizenship, state law has been applied by some courts to determine the
validity of the federal court's jurisdiction over the person of the foreign
corporate defendant.6 However, it is interesting to note that the circuit
courts of appeals are not in harmony on the issue of whether state law
should be determinative of a federal court's jurisdiction even in diversity
cases.' The doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkinss is the basis of the rationale
employed by those courts which use state law to establish whether, in
diversity situations, a corporation may be subjected to the jurisdiction of
a particular federal district court. Accordingly, those tribunals apply
the state test to see if the corporation was "doing business" so as to render
it amenable to service of process within the state. A United States
District Court sitting in Michigan in diversity formulated the view that
federal law should be applied to determine whether a foreign corporation is
doing business in the district so as to be subject to service of process,
when a federally-created right is asserted in a federal court. The same
court maintained that state law governs when a state-created right is
asserted in a federal court whose jurisdiction over the parties is based on
diversity of citizenship. 9 In the latter case, the additional problem of
fourteenth amendment due process restrictions must be dealt with, whereas
federal rules on territorial reach of service of process are subject only to
congressional policy.10
P. 4 (F). Since a corporation has not the physical properties of a natural person,
certain criteria have had to be developed in order to determine whether the
corporation is within these boundaries.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1958).
6. Pulson v. Am. Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948); Nichols v.
Cowles Magazines, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 864 (D. Mass. 1952).
7. For a state test: Partin v. Michael Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541 (3d Cir.
1953); Benjamin v. Robbins Air Rifle Co., 209 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1954); Canvas
Fabricators v. Wm. E. Hoopes Sons Co., 199 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1952). For a
federal test: Franch v. Gibbs Corp., 189 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Lasky v.
Norfolk W. Ry., 157 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1946).
8. 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938). In determining whether the federal
district court sitting in a diversity action should apply the substantive law of
Pennsylvania, the court looked to the very purpose of diversity of citizenshipjurisdiction, that is, the prevention of discrimination in state courts against those
who are not citizens of the state. The idea that the federal district court in diversity
is an adjunct state court has pervaded the atmosphere of a long line of diversity
cases since Erie. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S. Ct. 1464
(1945), the court held that Erie stressed the intention to insure that, in diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction cases, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should
be the same, so far as legal rules are determinative of the outcome, as it would be
if tried in a state court.
9. Singleton v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 20 F. R. D. 15 (E.D. Mich. 1956).
See Federal and State Precedents on Doing Business: Jurisdiction over Foreign
Corporations Under Erie, 67 YALx L.J. 1094 (1958).
10. Jaftex v. Randolph Mills, 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960). But congressional
action must conform to the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment.
[VOL. 7
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1961], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol7/iss1/4
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Cases decided by federal courts holding that foreign corporations
were or were not "doing business" under a state test, do not furnish
any "federal law" on the issue of a federal court's jurisdiction over
a foreign corporation in a suit arising under a federal statute. Tech-
nically, International Shoe Co. v. Washington" and McGee v. Inter-
national Life Ins. Co.,' 2 leading cases in the area of state jurisdiction
yield no federal jurisdictional law relative to what constitutes "doing busi-
ness". They established the limits to which a state might go in exercising
jurisdiction over foreign corporations and yet stop short of violating the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Limitations on the
jurisdiction of federal district courts over foreign corporations in non-
diversity cases have never been clearly defined. Apparently these cases must
be decided by looking to an undefined corpus of "federal law". Despite the
shadows of doubt which shroud the applicability of the International Shoe
rule to federal jurisdictional problems, one federal court applied that
formula in a case in which the jurisdiction of the federal court was
founded upon federal law. 13 In another action in a federal court, founded
not on diversity but on trademark infringement,' 4 the court looked to
International Shoe and said ". . . the rule as the Supreme Court has de-
fined it, seems clear that the defendant must have certain minimum
contacts within the territory of the forum of such character that the maint e-
nance of the suit does not offend traditional ideas of fair play and sub-
stantial justice."' 5
The phrase "doing business" in the federal venue statute 6 has been
a source of great consternation in determining jurisdiction over non-
resident corporations. The confusion stems from the failure of the
courts to distinguish between jurisdiction over the corporation and venue.' 7
However, those courts sensitive to the distinction often assume that "doing
business" for jurisdictional purposes is no different than "doing business"
for venue. 8 As one possible solution to the dilemma, one writer suggests
the use of federal "doing business" precedents for jurisdiction in order to
circumvent possible confusion created by one uniform federal venue
11. 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945). There the corporation maintained no
office in the state, nor did it have any stock of merchandise there, but the court
found that the solicitation of orders by the corporation's salesmen in the state, and
the shipping of the goods into the state were so regular and systematic as to con-
stitute doing business in the state.
12. 355 U.S. 220, 78 S. Ct. 199 (1957). A single insurance contract mailed
into the state of California by the foreign corporation established a substantial
connection with the state sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the state's courts.
13. Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore O.R., 212 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1954).
The court stated that the broad policy statements of the International Shoe particu-
larly extend to cases in which the jurisdiction of the federal court is dependent upon
federal law.
14. Consolidated Cosmetics v. D. A. Publishing Co., 186 F.2d 906 (7th Cir.
1951).
15. Id. at 907.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1952).
17. Cooke v. Kilgore Mfg. Co., 105 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
18. Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Brown & Bigelow, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 716,
724 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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definition of "doing business" and varying jurisdictional definitions of
"doing business" of the fifty states.'
Despite the obvious lack of uniformity among the courts in determining
a foreign corporation's amenability to service of process in federal question
cases, there can be seen a trend to shield these cases from the influences
of the states so that federal courts may, without any qualms, disregard
state standards and fourteenth amendment due process, when determining
whether personal jurisdiction may be had over the person of the corpo-
rate defendant.2 0
By the authority of a federal statute "a corporation may be sued in
any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business
or is doing business. '21 One might infer from this that the federal courts
are to determine what Congress meant by "doing business" as set out in
this statute. However, this statute is concerned with venue rather than
with jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure also are barren of any indication that the federal courts
are to formulate their own criteria for subjecting a foreign corporation
to the jurisdiction of a particular district court. Service of process may
be made "upon a domestic or foreign corporation" in a particular manner
under Rule 4 (D) (3),22 but Rule 4 (D) (7)28 provides that service of
process may also be made "in the manner prescribed by the law of the
state in which the service is made for the service of summons or other like
process upon any such defendant in an action brought in the courts of
general jurisdiction of that state." Rule 4 (D) (3) sets forth the manner
in which service of process is to be made upon the subject corporation,
but it makes no mention of when the corporation is so subject. The con-
clusion that must be reached is unavoidable. Congress has not yet set
forth a federal test to determine when, in a case based on federal law,
a foreign corporation is subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the
federal district court. Where then are the federal district courts to look?
The case at bar held that resort must be made to federal rather than to
state law. However, after observing that the court in doing so relied
chiefly on the rationale of Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore &
0. R.,24 one may seriously question the "distinction" between federal and
state criteria in this area,2 5 since that case relied in the main on the
19. Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts - Suggestionfor Reform, 7 VAND. L. Rnv. 608, 619 (1954).
20. Bar's Leaks Western, Inc. v. Pollock, 148 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
Due process limitations imposed by the Fifth Amendment, however, may not be
disregarded.
21. 28 U.S.C. 1391(c) (1958).
22. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(D) (3).
23. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(D) (7).
24. 212 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1954).
25. One circuit judge put it so well when he commented upon service under
New York and federal law, and he observed that "Neither in our decisions nor in
those of the New York Court of Appeals is there an admitted or defined distinction;
this has to be found in the nuances of meaning between the lines of judicial opinions."
Jaftex v. Randolph Mills, 282 F.2d 508, 509 (2d Cir. 1960).
[VOL. 7
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1961], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol7/iss1/4
